ALPHA-INDIA CONSULTANCY

SLCM-N, the Virginia-Class Submarine, and AUKUS

The sea-launched cruise missile–nuclear (SLCM-N) deployed on Virginia-class attack submarines will provide the US with flexible deterrence options in austere Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific theatres. In light of the SLCM-N, there are three options to consider when allocating US Virginia-class submarines that will impact the method and effectiveness of strategic deterrence through tactical and operational means. 

Nuclear Weapons and Military Preparedness in the Asia-Pacific

The United States is not militarily prepared to deter conflict with China over Taiwan. Whilst American military power in the Asia-Pacific is formidable, the sheer logistical challenges of deterrence with conventional forces in a multipolar maritime theatre fundamentally undermine the United States’ preparedness to fight and defeat a People’s Republic of China (PRC) assault on Taiwan.

Alternatively, credible deterrence may be more readily achieved through the threat of low-yield nuclear weapons actively dispersed throughout the Asia-Pacific.

Extending the Golden Dome: AUKUS Pillar 2

AUKUS pillar two leadership should prioritize the development of technologies and supporting systems for an effective extended Golden Dome architecture. America is unlikely to solve the problem in isolation by building a “tightly integrated system of low Earth orbit (LEO) satellites, terrestrial radar stations, directed-energy platforms, and kinetic interceptors” that senses, decides, and neutralizes incoming missiles. The linkages and opportunities for the prioritization of advanced technology development for missile defense can be found in the existing  AUKUS Pillar II architecture, including cyber capabilities, artificial intelligence (AI) and autonomy, quantum technologies, undersea capabilities, hypersonics and counter-hypersonics, electronic warfare capabilities, innovation and information sharing, and space capabilities.

Special operations by Israel and Ukraine were immediate tactical successes. Their strategic impact will take more time to assess.

While both Israel’s and Ukraine’s special operations are sure to provide unique lessons for covert missions against air power, their full impact on deterrence and longer-term strategic stability needs to be viewed from a broader and ongoing deterrence viewpoint. A weakened Iran may be more determined than ever in its nuclear ambitions to restore deterrence, and a humiliated Russia may be more willing to use nuclear weapons.